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In this article I identify some of the
science/policy interface issues relevant to the
EDS debate, drawing on several case studies
about some relatively well-known hazards of
the last 150 years or so. I deal brieﬂy with the
contingent nature of scientiﬁc knowledge, with
uncertainty and ignorance, and with some of
the conceptual and deﬁnitional issues that arise
from the wider and wise application of the pre-
cautionary principle to the management of
EDSs. As Christoforou (2002) has pointed
out, “discussing the precautionary principle is
probably the best analytical tool we have to
comprehend the complex relationship that
exists between science and risk regulation.”
Much of the argument in this article is
taken from the report by the European
Environment Agency (EEA), “Late Lessons
from Early Warnings: the Precautionary
Principle 1896–2000” (EEA 2001). I supple-
ment the narrative with observations on sev-
eral broader but related issues that have
dominated discussions on the practical appli-
cation of the precautionary principle since
publication of the EEA report.
Early Use of Precaution
The Vorsorgeprinzip, or “foresight” principle
(Kriebel and Tickner 2001; Tickner 2002),
emerged as a speciﬁc policy tool only during
the German debates on the possible role of air
pollution as a cause of “forest death” in the
1970s and 1980s (Boehmer-Christiansen 1994;
Kriebel and Tichner 2001). John Graham, one
of President Bush’s science policy advisors and
an otherwise trenchant critic of the precaution-
ary principle, has noted that 
Precaution, whether or not described as a formal
principle, has served mankind well in the past and
the history of public health instructs us to keep the
spirit of precaution alive and well. (Graham 2002)
Graham might have been thinking of the
Broad Street pump episode of 1854, when
precaution did indeed serve the people of
London well. At that time, John Snow, a
London physician, used the foresight princi-
ple to restrict access to polluted water coming
from the Broad Street pump, because he sus-
pected that it was the cause of the cholera
outbreaks that were plaguing such urban cen-
ters in those days (Snow 1936). 
Snow’s views on cholera causation were
not shared by The Royal College of Physicians,
who considered Snow’s thesis and rejected it as
untenable (Barau and Greenbough 1992).
They and other “authorities” of the day
believed that cholera was caused by airborne
contamination. This particular scientiﬁc “cer-
tainty” soon turned out to be certainly mis-
taken, with the last remaining doubt being
removed when Koch in Germany isolated the
cholera vibrio (Vibrio cholerae) from water in
1883 (Brock 1998).
From the association between exposure
to water polluted with human feces, and
cholera, observed by Snow in 1854, to Koch’s
discovery of the mechanism of action, took
30 years of further scientiﬁc inquiry. Such a
long timelag between acknowledging
compelling associations and understanding
their mechanisms of action is a common fea-
ture of scientiﬁc inquiry, as illustrated by the
unfolding of the role of endocrine disruption
in the histories of tributylin (TBT), polychlo-
rinated biphenyls (PCBs), diethylstilbestrol
(DES), the Great Lakes pollution, and of beef
hormones (EEA 2001).
For example, by the 1930s, evidence
already existed, albeit at a low level of proof,
that PCBs could poison people. This informa-
tion was not widely circulated among policy-
makers or other stakeholders until 30 years
later when there was a higher level of proof
that PCBs could cause serious harm to human
health and could accumulate in the Baltic food
chain. Had precautionary action at a level of
proof less than “beyond reasonable doubt”
been acceptable to and applied by policy mem-
bers of that era, many years of PCB use would
have been avoided. It was not until the 1970s,
however, that the ﬁrst regulatory actions were
taken by Sweden to ban these chemicals. The
European Union (EU) Directive 96/58/EC to
eliminate PCBs was not implemented until
1996, with a total phaseout planned by 2010
(Koppe and Keys 2001). Similarly, it is only
after more than half a century of human and
wildlife exposures to organochlorine com-
pounds from the Great Lakes that scientists are
beginning to comprehend the scale of damage
that occurred during that period. This damage
happened despite the publication of the book
Silent Spring (Carson 1962), which warned us
about the potential effects of organochlorine
pesticides on wildlife and humans (Gilbertson
2001). A final (but by no means the only)
example is that of the history of the anti-
miscarriage drug DES, first synthesized in
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the same year. Despite having been found to
be ineffective in preventing miscarriage in
1953, DES was widely marketed for the next
17 years, until 1970, when the ﬁrst evidence of
reproductive cancer in humans who had been
exposed to the drug in utero was reported. Had
DES been withdrawn for use during pregnancy
in 1953, the unecessary tragic exposure of mil-
lions of mothers, sons, and daughters could
have been avoided (Ibarreta and Swan 2001). 
There are, however, historical examples of
chemical contamination in which the applica-
tion of the precautionary principle to EDSs
has occurred. In Arachon, France, for exam-
ple, the precautionary principle was applied in
the early 1980s when the collapse of the valu-
able oyster beds was associated with the
increased use of boat paint containing the
antifoulant TBT (Gibbs 1993). These obser-
vations predated analytical techniques sensitive
enough to detect the environmental distribu-
tions of TBT (Alzieu et al. 1986). However,
the association between the explosive increase
in the use of TBT, the collapse of the oyster
beds, and the known acute toxicity of this
compound was sufficient to result in action.
The later discovery of widespread imposex in
dog-whelks, which was also strongly associated
with TBT pollution, gradually led to further
national and international actions to ban TBT
from the paints used on both inshore and
oceangoing vessels (Santillo et al. 2001).
Knowledge and Ignorance
Requires both Prevention 
and Precaution
Examples of the Broad Street pump, TBT,
DES, PCBs, and Great Lakes pollution
described here also illustrate the contingent
nature of knowledge. Today’s scientific cer-
tainties can be tomorrow’s mistakes, and
today’s research can both reduce and increase
scientific uncertainties, as the boundaries of
the known and the unknown expand. Waiting
for the results of more research before taking
action to reduce threatening exposures may
not only take decades but the new knowledge
may identify previously unknown sources of
both uncertainty and ignorance, as awareness
of what we do not know expands (Figure 1),
thereby supplying further reasons for inaction.
“The more we know, the more we realize
what we don’t know” is not an uncommon
scientiﬁc experience. Socrates observed some
time ago: “I am the wisest man alive, for I
know one thing, and that is that I know noth-
ing”. (Helm 1997).
This observation was an early lesson that
has been forgotten lately by many scientists
and politicians, who often put misplaced cer-
tainty in today’s scientific knowledge or
assume that uncertainty can only be reduced
and not increased by further research.
The distinction between uncertainty and
ignorance is important. Ignorance is not
knowing what we do not know and is the
source of scientific surprises. It is distinct
from uncertainties that arise from gaps in
knowledge and from variances in sampling
and monitoring, parameter variability, model
assumptions, and in the other attempts to
approximate reality.
Forseeing and preventing hazards in the
context of ignorance presents particular chal-
lenges to decision makers. At first sight it
seems impossible to do anything to avoid or
mitigate surprises such as the appearance of
the ozone hole, or of imposex in sea snails
when we have no idea that they are going to
occur. Ignorance ensures that there will
always be surprises. Notwithstanding this,
there are some measures that could help the
consequences of ignorance and the impacts
of surprises:
• Using intrinsic properties as generic predic-
tors for unknown but possible impacts, for
example, the persistence, bioaccumulation,
and spatial range potential of chemical sub-
stances (Stroebe et al. 2004).
• Reducing specific exposures to potentially
harmful agents on the basis of credible early
warnings of initial harmful impacts, thus
limiting the size of any other surprise
impacts from the same agent, such as the
asbestos cancers that followed asbestosis;
and the PCB neurotoxicological effects that
followed its wildlife impacts.
• Promoting a diversity of robust and adapt-
able technological and social options to meet
needs, which limits technological monopo-
lies (such as asbestos, chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs), PCBs) and therefore reduces the
scale of any surprise from any one option.
• Using scenarios and long-term research and
monitoring of surprise-sensitive sentinels,
such as, possibly, amphibians (Hayes et al.
2006a)to anticipate surprises more readily.
The distinction between prevention and
precaution is also important. Preventing haz-
ards from known risks is relatively easy and
does not require precaution. Banning smok-
ing, or asbestos, today requires only acts of
prevention to avoid the well-known risks.
However, it would have required precaution
(or foresight, based on sufﬁcient evidence) to
have justified acts to avoid exposure to the
then uncertain hazards of asbestos in the
1930s–1950s, or to those of tobacco smoke in
the 1960s. Such precautionary acts at those
times, if implemented successfully, would
have saved many more lives in Europe than
today’s acts of prevention are doing.
There is much discussion generated by
the many different interpretations of concepts
such as prevention, precaution, risk, uncer-
tainty, and ignorance in debates on the pre-
cautionary principle. In Table 1 I provide
information to clarify these and other key
terms to help reduce unnecessary arguing
about their meanings.
The relatively rare but successful acts of
“precautionary prevention” in 1854 regarding
cholera in England and in the 1980s regard-
ing TBT in France, together with many
examples of failure to use the precautionary
principle in other case studies (EEA 2001),
illustrate the need for appropriate precaution-
ary action to avoid serious threats to health or
environments. Such precautionary action
needs to be justiﬁed by an appropriate level of
scientific evidence regarding the association
between hazardous exposures and potential ill
health (or environmental damage) without
waiting for the certainty of causation, or for
the knowledge about mechanisms of action to
appear, which can take many decades of fur-
ther research. As Hegel observed, “the owl of
Minerva spreads its wings only with the
falling of the dusk” (Hegel 2001). Waiting for
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Table 1. Toward a clariﬁcation of key terms.
Situation State and dates of knowledge Examples of action
Risk Known impacts; known probabilities, Prevention: action taken to reduce known hazards,
e.g., asbestos e.g., eliminate exposure to asbestos dust
Uncertainty Known impacts; unknown probabilities, Precautionary prevention: action taken to reduce
e.g., antibiotics in animal feed and associated exposure to potential hazards
human resistance to those antibiotics
Ignorance Unknown impacts and therefore unknown Precaution: action taken to anticipate, identify, and
probabilities, e.g., the surprise of reduce the impact of surprises
chloroﬂuorcarbons (CFCs), pre-1974.
From “Late Lessons” (EEA 2001).
Today’s knowledge
Tomorrow’s knowledge
Gaps in today’s knowledge
Gaps in tomorrow’s knowledge
No knowledge yet
Figure 1. Knowing and not knowing: a dynamic
expansion.the “dusk” of certain knowledge before taking
action to reduce exposures, especially when
there is a long time between such exposures
and serious impacts, would often be too late
to avoid costly damage. Precautionary action
therefore may need to be taken while the
“owl” is still sleeping.
The Precautionary Principle:
Some Deﬁnitions and
Interpretations
The debates on the Vorsorgeprinzip shifted
from the national level in Germany to the
international level in the 1980s and 1990s,
initially in the field of conservation (United
Nations 1982), but then particularly in
marine pollution, where an overload of data
accompanied an insufficiency of knowledge.
This situation generated the need to act with
precaution to reduce the large amounts of
chemical pollution entering the North Sea
(Sheppard 1997). Since then, many interna-
tional treaties have included reference to the
precautionary principle, or, as they refer to it
in the United States, the precautionary
approach. In Appendix 1 I provide examples,
including the often-cited version from the
Third North Sea Ministerial Conference held
7–8 March 1990 in The Hague. This confer-
ence called for action to avoid potentially
damaging impacts of substances, even where
there is no scientific evidence to prove a
causal link between emissions and effects.
This North Sea definition has often and
sometimes mischievously been used to deride
the precautionary principle by claims that it
appears to justify action even when there is no
scientific evidence that associates exposures
with effects. However, the North Sea confer-
ence text on the precautionary principle clearly
links the words “no scientiﬁc evidence” with
the words “to prove a causal link.” We have
already seen with the Broad Street pump and
TBT examples that there signiﬁcant difference
exists between evidence about an association
and evidence that is robust enough to establish
a causal link. (Bradford Hill 1965). All ofﬁcial
deﬁnitions require some scientiﬁc evidence of
an actual or potential association between
exposures and current, or potential, impacts.
This linkage is made clearer in the widely
quoted Wingspread statement on the precau-
tionary principle, which stated the following:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human
health or the environment, precautionary mea-
sures should be taken, even if some cause-and-
effect relationships are not fully established
scientiﬁcally. In this context the proponent of an
activity, rather than the public, should bear the
burden of proof. The process of applying the
Precautionary Principle must be open, informed
and democratic, and must include potentially
affected parties. It must also involve an examina-
tion of the full range of alternatives, including no
action. (Raffensperger and Tickner 1999)
The later international treaties that cite
the precautionary principle, such as the
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
Pollutants (2005), also tend to encourage
public participation and transparency. 
However, there is still much disagreement
and discussion about the interpretation and
practical application of the precautionary
principle, because of, in part, this lack of clar-
ity over its definition, and particularly over
the sufficiency of good scientific evidence
needed to justify public policy action. For
example, most deﬁnitions use a double nega-
tive to deﬁne the precautionary principle; that
is, they identify reasons that cannot be used
to justify not acting. They also fail to identify
that a sufﬁciency of evidence is needed to jus-
tify the case-speciﬁc action required to avoid
serious hazards.
The communication from the EU on the
precautionary principle (European Commission
2000) does specify that “reasonable grounds for
concern” are needed to justify action under the
precautionary principle, but it neither makes
explicit that these grounds will be case-speciﬁc
nor does it explicitly distinguish between risk,
uncertainty, and ignorance.
The European Commission communi-
cation has been a very useful input to the
debates on the precautionary principle, and it
has helped initiate what the Commission
stressed was “not the last word” but was,
rather, the point of departure for a broader
study of the conditions in which risks should
be assessed, appraised, managed, and commu-
nicated. Since the EC Communication, both
EU case law and the regulation establishing
the new European Food Safety Authority
(EFSA; EU 2002) have further clarified the
circumstances of use and application of the
precautionary principle.
EEA experience over the last 5 years is that
much unnecessary debate still arises from the
lack of a clearer deﬁnition of the precautionary
principle itself, as opposed to the clariﬁcations
on its application that have emerged from EU
case law and secondary legislation. The working
EEA definition used in the “Late Lessons”
report (EEA 2001) has therefore been improved
in light of subsequent discussions and legal
developments, and it is provided below in the
hope that it will facilitate constructive debate
on its interpretation and application.
The Precautionary Principle provides justiﬁcation
for public policy actions in situations of scientiﬁc
complexity, uncertainty and ignorance, where there
may be a need to act in order to avoid, or reduce,
potentially serious or irreversible threats to health
or the environment, using an appropriate level of
scientific evidence, and taking into account the
likely pros and cons of action and inaction.
The EEA definition explicitly specifies
complexity, uncertainty, and ignorance as con-
texts for applying the precautionary principle.
It also makes clear that a case-specific
sufﬁciency of scientiﬁc evidence is needed to
justify public policy action to avoid or reduce
hazards. The definition is explicit about the
tradeoff between action and inaction, and it
widens the conventionally narrow, and usually
quantiﬁable, interpretation of costs and beneﬁts
to embrace the wider and sometimes unquan-
tifiable pros and cons. Some of these wider
issues such as loss of the ozone layer, or of pub-
lic trust in science are unquantiﬁable, but they
can sometimes be more damaging to society
than the quantifiable impacts. Moreover,
they need to be included in comprehensive
risk assessments.
Different Levels of Proof 
for Different Purposes
The level of proof (or strength of scientific
evidence) that would be appropriate to justify
public action in each case varies with the pros
and cons of action or inaction. These factors
include the nature and distribution of potential
harm, the beneﬁts of the agent or activity under
suspicion, the availability of feasible alternatives,
and the overall goals of public policy. Such pol-
icy goals can include the achievement of the
high levels of protection of public health, of
consumer safety, and of the environment.
The use of different levels of proof is not a
new idea; societies often use different levels of
proof for different purposes. For example, a
high level of proof (or strength of evidence)
such as beyond all reasonable doubt is used to
achieve good science where A is seen to cause B
only when the evidence is very strong. Such a
high level of proof is also used to minimize the
costs of being wrong in the criminal trial of a
suspected murderer, where it is usually
regarded as better to let several guilty men go
free than it is to wrongly convict an innocent
man. However, in a civil trial setting where, for
example, a citizen seeks compensation for
neglectful treatment at work, which has
resulted in an accident or ill health, the court
often uses a lower level of proof commensurate
with the costs of being wrong in this different
situation. In compensation cases, an already
injured party is usually given the beneﬁt of the
doubt by the use of a medium level of proof,
such as balance of evidence or probability. It is
seen as being less damaging (or less costly in
the wider sense) to give compensation to some-
one who was not treated negligently than it is
not to provide compensation to someone who
was treated negligently. The “broad shoulders”
of insurance companies are seen as able to bear
the costs of mistaken judgments rather better
than the much narrower shoulders of an
injured citizen. In each of these two illustra-
tions, it is the nature and distribution of the
costs of being wrong that determines the level
of proof (or strength of evidence) that is
appropriate to the particular case.
Gee
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also been an important issue in the climate
change debates. The International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) discussed this issue at
length before formulating their 1995 conclu-
sion (IPCC 1995) that “on the balance of evi-
dence,” mankind is disturbing the global
climate. They further elaborated on this issue in
their 2001 report (IPCC 2001, where they
identiﬁed seven levels of proof (or strengths of
evidence) that can be used to characterize the
scientific evidence for a particular climate
change hypothesis. Table 2 provides the middle
ﬁve of these levels of proof and illustrates their
practical application to a variety of different
societal purposes.
Bradford Hill was very concerned about
the social responsibility of scientists, and he
concluded his classic 1965 paper on causation
with a “call for action” in which he also pro-
posed the concept of case-speciﬁc and differ-
ential levels of proof. His three examples
ranged from “relatively slight” to “very
strong” evidence, depending on the nature of
the potential impacts and of the pros and
cons in each specific case. These examples
included “possibly teratogenic medicine for
pregnant women,” probable carcinogen in the
workplace, and restrictions on public smoking
or diets, respectively (Bradford Hill 1965).
Public Participation 
in Risk Analysis
Choosing an appropriate level of proof for a
particular case is clearly based on value judg-
ments about the acceptability of the costs, and
of their distribution, of being wrong in both
directions, namely, of acting or not acting to
reduce threatening exposures. Therefore, it is
necessary to involve the public in decisions
about serious hazards and their avoidance: and
to do so for all stages of the risk analysis process,
as Figure 2 illustrates.
The EEA Report or the Precautionary
Principle (EEA 2001) concludes with 12 late
lessons. These lessons represent an attempt to
synthesize the 14 different experiences from the
very different case study chapters into generic
knowledge that can help inform policymaking
for regulating new technologies, including
genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMOs), nan-
otechnologies, and mobile phones. The lessons
can also provide guidance for regulating EDSs as
phthalates, atrazine, and bisphenol A, for which
the luxury of hindsight is not yet available.
The idea of the 12 late lessons is to make
the most of past experience to help anticipate
future surprises while recognizing that history
never exactly repeats itself. When adopted
along with the best available science, the
lessons will help minimize hazards without
compromising innovation. The lessons are
listed in Table 3.
Three of the twelve late lessons (numbers
5, 9, and 10) explicitly invite early involvement
of the public and other stakeholders at all
stages of risk analysis. This approach has been
actively encouraged in many other inﬂuential
reports during the last decade (National
Research Council 1994; WBGU 2000; Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution
1998; U.S. Presidential/Congressional
Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management (1997).
The best available science is therefore a
necessary but insufﬁcient condition for sound
public policymaking on potential threats to
health and the environment. Where there is
scientiﬁc uncertainty and ignorance, “it is pri-
marily the task of the risk managers to pro-
vide risk assessors with guidance on the
science policy to apply in their risk assess-
ments” (Christoforou 2003). The content of
this science policy advice, as well as the nature
and scope of the questions to be addressed by
the risk assessors, need to be formulated by
the risk managers and relevant stakeholders at
the initial stages of the risk analysis, as illus-
trated in Figure 2. Involving the public not
only in all stages of risk analysis but also in
helping to set research agendas and techno-
logical trajectories (Wilsdon and Willis 2004)
is not easy. Many experiments, in both
Europe and the the United States, with focus
groups, deliberative polling, citizen juries, and
extended peer review (Funtovicz and Ravetz
1990, 1992), are exploring appropriate ways
forward.
The issue of time is also critical for risk
analysis and application of the precautionary
principle. For example, the time from the ﬁrst
scientifically based early warnings (1896 for
medical X rays, 1897 for benzene, 1898 for
asbestos) to the time of policy action that
effectively reduced damage, was often
30–100 years. Some consequences of the fail-
ures to act in good time (e.g., on CFCs or
asbestos) continue to cause damage over even
longer time periods. Figure 3 illustrates, with
the CFCs example, the importance of such
time lags and associated “long tail” conse-
quences. The ozone hole will cause many
thousands of extra skin cancers in today’s chil-
dren but the cancers will only peak around the
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Table 2. Different levels of proof for different purposes: some examples and illustrations.
Probability (%) Quantitative descriptora Qualitative descriptor Illustrations
100 Very likely  Statistical signiﬁcance Part of strong scientiﬁc evidence for causation
(90–99%) Beyond all reasonable doubt Most criminal law and the Swedish Chemical Law 1973
(McCormick 2001), for evidence of safety of substances under 
suspicion; burden of proof on manufacturers 
Likely  Reasonable certainty Food Quality Protection Act (1996) 
(66–90%) Sufﬁcient scientiﬁc evidence To justify a trade restriction designed to protect human, animal, 
or plant health under World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement, Article 2.2, 
(WTO 1994a)
Medium likelihood  Balance of evidence IPCC (1995, 2001)
(33–66%) Balance of probabilities Much civil and some administrative law
Reasonable grounds for concern European Commission communication on the precautionary 
principle (European Commission 2000)
Strong possibility British Nuclear Fuels occupational radiation compensation 
scheme (20–50% probabilities triggering different  
awards ≥ 50%, which then triggers full compensation)
(Mummery and Alderson 1989)
Low likelihood (10–33%) Scientiﬁc suspicion of risk Swedish Chemical Law 1973 (McCormick 2001), for sufﬁcient 
evidence to take precautionary action on potential harm from 
substances; burden of proof on regulators
Available pertinent information To justify a provisional trade restriction under WTO SPS
Agreement, Article 5.7, where scientiﬁc information is 
insufﬁcient (WTO 1994b)
Very unlikely (1–10%) Low risk Household ﬁre insurance
0 Negligible and insigniﬁcant Food Quality Protection Act (1996)
aProbability bands based on IPCC (2001).middle of this century because of the long
latent period between exposure and effect.
EDSs also have multigenerational impacts
that invite serious consideration of the time
lag implications of exposures. Such long-term
but foreseeable impacts raise liability and
compensation issues, including appropriate
discount rates (if any) on future costs and
benefits, which, as value-laden choices, also
need to be discussed by stakeholder groups.
Again, experience with these long-term issues
in the climate change ﬁeld may be helpful in
managing them in the EDS ﬁeld.
Some Early Warnings
The main issues discussed so far, such as the
contingency of knowledge, ignorance and sur-
prises, appropriate levels of evidence for policy
actions, and public participation in risk analy-
sis, are critical to the successful application of
both scientiﬁc knowledge and the precaution-
ary principle to public policymaking. They are
therefore relevant to discussions about the
potentially new hazards that are now emerg-
ing, for example, from nanotechnology (Royal
Society 2003), from nonionizing radiation
arising from the use of mobile phones (Stewart
Reports 2004), and from EDSs [World
Health Organization (WHO) 2002].
With such newly emerging hazards, it can
be helpful to use historical examples to illustrate
what a scientiﬁcally based early warning looks
like because it is often difficult to recognize
such warnings properly when they occur. A
good example is that provided by the U.K.
Medical Research Council’s Swann Committee
in 1969. They were asked to assess the evidence
for risks of resistance to antibiotics in humans
following the prolonged ingestion of trace
amounts of antibiotics arising from their use as
growth promoters in animal feed (Edqvist and
Pedersen 2001). They concluded that
Despite the gaps in our knowledge ...w e
believe...o n   the basis of evidence presented to us,
that this assessment is a sufﬁciently sound basis for
action. . . . The cry for more research should not be
allowed to hold up our recommendations . . .
sales/use of AFA should be strictly controlled via tight
criteria, despite not knowing mechanisms of action,
nor foreseeing all effects. (Swann 1969)
The Swann Committee also concluded that
it would be more rewarding and innovative to
improve animal husbandry as a means of
encouraging disease-free animal growth rather
than to employ the cruder approach of feeding
the animals diets containing antimicrobials.
Despite the gaps in knowledge, the need
for much more research, and considerable
ignorance about the mechanisms of action,
sufficient evidence was identified and
described by the Swann Report to justify the
need for public authorities to restrict the possi-
bility of exposures to antibiotics from animal
growth promoters.
This early warning was initially heeded,
but it was then progressively ignored by the
pharmaceutical companies and regulatory
authorities, who wanted more scientiﬁc justi-
fication for restricting antimicrobial growth
promoters. However, in 1985 in Sweden, and
then in the EU in 1999, the use of antibiotics
as growth promoters was ﬁnally banned.
Pfizer, the main supplier of such anti-
biotics in Europe, appealed against the
European Commission banning decision,
pleading an insufﬁciency of scientiﬁc evidence.
They lost this case at the European Court of
Justice (2002a, 2002b), and the case further
clarified the proper use and application of
the precautionary principle in circumstances
of scientific uncertainty and of widespread,
if low, public exposures to a potentially
serious threat.
An example in the United States of an
early warning is from the lead in gasoline
story. This warning was largely ignored for
over 50 years, resulting in much damage to
the intelligence and behavior of children in
America, Europe, and the rest of the motor-
ized world. Yandell Hendersson, Chair of the
Medical Research Board, U.S. Aviation
Service, who had been asked to look at the
scientiﬁc evidence on the possible hazards of
tetraethyl lead during the temporary ban on
lead in gasoline, concluded in 1925 that
It seems likely that the development of lead poi-
soning will come on so insidiously that leaded
gasoline will be in nearly universal use . . . before
the public and the government awakens to the sit-
uation. (Rosner and Markowitz 2002)
Motorized societies would have gained
much in dollars, brainpower, and social cohe-
sion had they heeded this foresight.
An early warning from the EDS field in
the United States came in 1966 when Hickey
and co-workers documented the effects of
DDT and dieldrin on the reproductive health
of Lake Michigan herring gulls (Gilbertson
2001; Hickey et al. 1966). A simultaneous
EDS early warning in Europe also came from
Gee
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Figure 3. CFCs: skin cancer and time lags (EEA 2001).
Table 3. Twelve late lessons.
Identify/clarify the framing and assumptions
1. Manage risk, uncertainty, and ignorance
2. Identify/reduce “blind spots” in the science
3. Assess/account for all pros and cons of action/
inaction
4. Analyze/evaluate alternative options
5. Take account of stakeholder values
6. Avoid “paralysis by analysis” by acting to reduce 
hazards via the precautionary principle.
Broaden assessment information
7. Identify/reduce interdisciplinary obstacles to 
learning
8. Identify/reduce institutional obstacles to learning
9. Use lay, local, and specialist knowledge
10. Identify/anticipate real world conditions
11. Ensure regulatory and informational independence
12. Use more long-term (i.e., decades long) monitoring 
and research1966 to 1969, when Jensen observed PCBs in
Baltic sea eagles (Koppe and Keys 2001).
False Negatives and 
False Positives
The 14 case studies in the “Late Lessons”
Report (EEA 2001) include several chemicals
(TBT, benzene, PCBs, CFCs, methyl tertiary
butyl ether, sulfur dioxide, and other Great
Lakes pollutants); two pharmaceuticals (DES
and beef hormones); two physical agents
(asbestos and medical X rays); one pathogen
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy); and
contaminated ﬁsheries. These case studies are
all examples of false negatives because the
agents or activities were regarded as not harm-
ful for some time before evidence showed that
they were indeed hazardous. We tried to
include a false positive case study in the report
(i.e., where actions to reduce potential haz-
ards were unnecessary), but we failed to ﬁnd
either authors or sufﬁciently robust examples
to use. Providing evidence of false positives is
more difficult than with false negatives
(Mazur 2004). How robust should the evi-
dence be and over what periods of time
should the evidence be obtained on the
absence of harm before investigators conclude
that a restricted substance or activity is with-
out signiﬁcant risk?
Volume 2 of “Late Lessons,” which the
EEA intends to publish in partnership with
Collegium Ramazzini in 2006, will include a
chapter exploring the issues raised by false
positives. This chapter will include lessons to
be learned from such apparent examples as
the EU ban on food irradiation and hazard
labeling on saccharin in the United States.
The Y2K computer bug story may also carry
some interesting lessons. The remaining chap-
ters in Volume 2 will describe false negatives
such as those associated with the Aral Sea
disaster, bis(chloromethyl)ether, mercury,
climate change, and vinyl chloride.
Why are there so many false negatives to
write about, and is this relevant to EDSs?
Conclusions based on the ﬁrst “Late Lessons”
volume of case studies point in two primary
directions. First, there is a bias within the
health and environmental sciences toward
avoiding false positives, thereby generating
more false negatives. Second, there is a domi-
nance among decision makers of short-term,
speciﬁc, economic and political interests over
the longer term, diffuse, and overall interests
and welfare of society. The latter point needs
to be further explored, particularly within the
political sciences. Researchers could examine
the ways in which society’s long-term interests
can be promoted more effectively within
political and institutional arrangements that
have, or could have, an explicit mandate to
look after the longer-term welfare of society.
Such efforts could thereby better resist the
short-term pressures of particular economic or
political interests. The judiciary in democra-
cies can play part of this role, as can long-run-
ning advisory bodies such as the Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution
(U.K.) or the German Advisory Council on
Global Change (WBGU).
The current and increasing dominance of
the short term in markets and in parliamen-
tary democracies makes this kind of proactive
foresight an important issue. The experiments
we are conducting with planet earth and its
ecosystems require more long-term monitor-
ing of surprise-sensitive parameters that
could, we hope, give us early warnings of
impending harm. Such long-term monitoring
requires long-term funding from appropri-
ately designed institutions, and such funding
and institutions are in short supply. The case
studies in Volume 1 of “Late Lessons” (EEA
2001) illustrate both the great value, (e.g., in
the TBT, DES, Great Lakes, and CFCs sto-
ries), yet relative paucity, of long-term moni-
toring. Such monitoring can contribute to the
“patient science” that slowly evolving natural
systems require in order that they may be
understood better.
Since the publication of “Late Lessons,” we
have explored further the second cause of false
negatives, namely, the issue of bias within the
health and environmental sciences. Table 4 lists
16 features of methods and culture in the envi-
ronmental and health sciences and shows their
main directions of error. Of these, only 3 fea-
tures tend toward generating false positives,
whereas 12 tend toward generating false nega-
tives. This proportion produces robust science,
based on strong foundations of knowledge, but
it can thereby encourage poor public policy
regarding hazard prevention. The goals of sci-
ence and public policymaking for health and
environmental hazards are different. Science
places greater priority on avoiding false positives
by accepting only very high levels of proof of
causality, whereas public policy tries to priori-
tize the avoidance of false negatives on the basis
of sufﬁcient evidence of potential harm.
Table 4 is derived from papers presented
on the precautionary principle to a conference
organized by the Collegium Ramazzini, the
EEA, the WHO, and the National Institute
of Environmental Health Sciences in 2002
(Grandjean et al. 2003). This table provides a
first and tentative step in trying to capture
and communicate the main directions of this
bias within the environmental and health sci-
ences, a bias of which decision makers and the
public should be aware.
Toward Greater Realism 
in the Science of EDSs?
The appropriate balance between false nega-
tives and positives was addressed at a Joint
Research Council/EEA workshop on the pre-
cautionary principle and scientiﬁc uncertainty.
This workshop was held during the “Bridging
the Gap” Conference, 2001, organized by the
Swedish Presidency of the EU, in partnership
with the EEA and the European Commission
Directorate General of the Environment. It
drew the following conclusion:
Improved scientific methods to achieve a more
ethically acceptable and economically efﬁcient bal-
ance between the generation of “false negatives”
and “false positives” are needed. (Swedish
Environmental Protection Agency 2001)
How this goal can be achieved without
compromising science remains to be explored
(Grandjean 2004; Grandjean et al. 2004).
However, it is clearly necessary, particularly
when dealing with EDSs, for scientiﬁc meth-
ods not only to take into account the false
negative/positive bias in methodologies but
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Table 4. On being wrong: environmental and health sciences and their directions of error.
Maina directions of error
Scientiﬁc studies Some methodological features increase chances of detecting:
Experimental studies High doses False positive
(animal laboratory) Short (in biological terms) range of doses False negative
Low genetic variability False negative
Few exposures to mixtures False negative
Few fetal–lifetime exposures False negative
High fertility strains False negative (developmental/
reproductive end points)
Observational studies Confounders False positive
(wildlife and humans) Inappropriate controls False positive/negative
Nondifferential exposure misclassiﬁcation False negative
Inadequate followup False negative
Lost cases False negative
Simple models that do not reﬂect complexity False negative
Both experimental and Publication bias toward positives False positive
observational studies Scientiﬁc/cultural pressure to avoid false positives False negative
Low statistical power (e.g., from small studies) False negative
Use of 5% probability level to minimize chances False negative
of false positives
aSome features can go either way (e.g., inappropriate controls), but most of the features err mainly in the direction shown
in this table.also to reflect other realities more clearly,
including multicausality, thresholds, timing
of dose, and mixtures. For example, Hayes
et al. (2006a, 2006b) has shown that synergis-
tic effects of atrazine in mixtures of other pes-
ticides at ecologically relevant concentrations
can have delayed negative impacts.
Hayes (2006a) also found that pesticide
exposures have even more pronounced adverse
effects when combined with other environmen-
tal stressors, including decreased water level,
parasites, and increased population density.
Also, Relyea (2003) found that some pesticides
were detrimental at much lower concentrations
when combined with predator stress.
The case studies on TBT and DES illus-
trate the relevance of these real-life complexi-
ties to the wider EDS issue. For example, the
unfolding of the TBT story was accompanied
by an increased appreciation of scientiﬁc com-
plexity arising from the discoveries that adverse
impacts were caused by very low doses (i.e., in
parts per trillion); that high exposure concen-
trations were found in unexpected places (e.g.,
in the marine microlayer); and that bioaccu-
mulation in higher marine animals, including
seafood for human consumption, was greater
than expected. The early actions on exposure
reduction in France and the United Kingdom
from 1982 to 1985 were based on a strength of
evidence for the association only; knowledge
about causality, mechanisms of action and
other complexities came much later.
More recently, pesticides such as atrazine
are causing a repeat of some of the lessons of
TBT. For example, Hayes et al. (2006a,
2006b) claims that atrazine can cause her-
maphroditism and multiple testes in male
amphibians at doses as low as 0.01 ppb, [which
is 30 times lower than the current U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency drinking
water standard (U.S EPA 2006)]. Moreover,
chemical castration of amphibians by atrazine
was increased when it was combined with
other pesticides typically used on cornﬁelds in
Nebraska (Hayes et al. 2006a).
We were lucky in some ways with the TBT
story. A highly specific, initially uncommon
impact (imposex) was quickly linked to one
chemical—TBT. This relatively easily identi-
ﬁed linkage is not likely for the more common
and multicausal impacts on development and
reproduction in animals or in humans, where
poor sperm quality, infertility, and breast can-
cer are the impacts under suspicion.
Key lessons from the DES story are also
instructive because it provides the clearest
example of endocrine disruption in humans.
These lessons include the absence of visible
and immediate teratogenic effects (which was
wrongly considered robust evidence for the
absence of reproductive toxicity) and the tim-
ing of the dose determining the poison [in
contrast to the well-known “dose determines
the poison” dictum of Paracelsus (Ottoboni
1997)]. Timing is also relevant to other bio-
logical end points. For example, “the time of
life when exposures take place may be critical
in defining dose–response relationships of
EDSs for breast cancer as well as for other
health effects”(WHO 2002). Although the
exposure levels were higher than the usual
environmental levels of other EDSs, the DES
story provides a clear warning about the
potential dangers of perturbing the endocrine
system with synthetic chemicals.
With over 20,000 publications, DES is a
well-studied compound, yet many doubts per-
sist about its mechanisms of action. Because no
dose–effect relationship has been found in
humans, it cannot be ruled out that DES could
have been toxic at low doses, and that other less
potent xenoestrogens could have similar effects.
If we still have few certainties about DES
after so much time and research, what should
our attitude be toward other EDSs, about
which we know much less? Many EDSs have
either not been studied or have often been
studied in isolation in particular strains of lab-
oratory animals that sometimes may be the
least susceptible strains.
It is clear from the EDS case studies in the
EEA report (2001) and from the science now
being reported in this monograph that estro-
gens and antiandrogens have many effects.
These effects can be dose related, dose inde-
pendent, or even reversed according to the
dose, its timing, and the genetic, sexual, and
other differences in the host.
It is clear that multiple complexities of
reality must be considered in any reasonable
assessment of the potential impact of a chemi-
cal on the environment. These complexities
can include concomitant exposures to natural
and synthetic EDSs, as well as to mixtures;
hormonal imprinting; cross-talk among
endocrine systems; generational impacts; the
difficulty of differentiating between benign
and adverse impacts; and the effects arising
from the disturbance to balances between
opposing elements in complex systems. When
considering these complications, it is apparent
that we are going to be unpleasantly surprised
by future EDS stories. We are not capable of
avoiding many surprises, but we need much
more realistic science and wider use of precau-
tion if we are to minimize their impacts.
The reality of mixtures particularly needs
to considered, as Hayes et al. (2006a) points
out. Boone and James (2003) have similarly
pointed out that 
if we fail to test multifactor hypotheses, we risk
proposing solutions that are too simplistic, thus fail-
ing to solve environmental problems at the cost of
population and species extinction. Single-factor
explanations simply may not be sufﬁcient to explain
widespread phenomenoa such as amphibian
declines.
The science of EDSs requires more than such
realism about mixtures and multicausality.
EDS science also needs to consider the asym-
metry of measurement precision between
gene typing and environmental exposure
assessment. As Vineis (2004) has observed,
this asymmetry is likely to lead to an underes-
timation of the effects of the environment
and an overestimation of the effects of genes
within their interactions.
The implications of multicausality and of
interactions among genes, the host condition,
and environmental stressors for research seem
not to have been fully recognized elsewhere in
the environmental and health science literature.
Sing (2004) has noted that 
neither genes nor their environments, but their
interactions are causations. . . . pretending that the
aetiology of common diseases like CVD, cancer,
diabetes, and psychiatric disorders are caused by the
independent actions of multiple agents is deterring
progress. 
He calls for “research that reﬂects the reality
of the problem” and notes that 
a reductionist approach that has no interest in com-
plexity discourages imaginative solutions. . . . we
need an academic environment that puts greater
value on how the parts are put together.
The implications of complexity and multi-
causality for evaluating evidence also need to
be addressed. Since 1965 overall evaluations
of scientific evidence for policymaking on
health hazards have often been based, implic-
itly or explicitly, on the nine “Bradford Hill
Criteria” (which Bradford Hill actually called
“features” of evidence rather than “criteria”)
that were produced in response to the smok-
ing and health controversy of the 1960s.
(U.S. Surgeon General 1964; Bradford Hill
1965). However, the criteria have often been
misused in debates on EDSs to show that
there is little evidence of an association
between exposures and harm, when the evi-
dence actually suggests that there may be such
a link (Ashby et al. 1997; WHO 2002).
Complexity and gene/host variability, two
of the apparently more robust of the nine cri-
teria, may not be so robust in the context of
multicausality. For example, consistency of
study findings is not always to be expected.
Needleman et al. (1979) provided the ﬁrst of
what could be called the second generation of
early warnings on lead in gasoline in 1979
and observed that 
Consistency in nature does not require that all or
even a majority of studies ﬁnd the same effect. If
all studies of lead showed the same relationship
between variables, one would be startled, perhaps
justiﬁably suspicious.
A similar conclusion is valid for EDSs
because of multicausality and variable expo-
sure conditions as Oehlmann points out
(Oehlmann et al. 2006).
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between studies on the same hazard can pro-
vide robust evidence for a causal link, but the
absence of such consistency may not provide
very robust evidence for the absence of a real
association. In other words, the criterion of
consistency is asymmetrical, like most of the
other Bradford Hill criteria.
Similarly, the criterion of temporality,
which says that the putative cause X of harm
Y must come before Y appears, is robust in a
simple, unicausal world. In a multicausal,
complex world of common biological end
points that have several chains of causation,
this condition of robustness may not necessar-
ily be so. For example, falling sperm counts
can have multiple, co-causal factors, some of
which may have been effective at increasing
the incidence of the biological end point in
question in advance of the stressors in focus,
thereby confounding the analysis of temporal-
ity. It follows that chlorine-based chemicals
cannot be dismissed on temporality grounds
as a possible causal factor in falling sperm
counts just because sperm counts started to
fall in some regions before chlorine chemical
production took off, as has been argued previ-
ously (WHO 2002). Other causal factors
responsible for the earlier fall in sperm counts
could have been later joined by chlorinated
chemicals, whose new, additional effects on
sperm counts could have been combined with
the impacts of the other, and differentially
changing, co-causal factors.
The resulting overall sperm count trends
could then be rising, falling, or static, depend-
ing on the combined direction and strengths
of the co-causal factors and the time lags of
their impacts. Chlorine chemicals may or may
not be co-causal factors in falling sperm
counts, but the use of the temporality argu-
ment by the WHO does not provide robust
evidence that they are not causally involved.
The presence of temporality, such as con-
sistency,” may be robust evidence for an asso-
ciation being causal, but its absence may not
provide robust evidence against an associa-
tion. Bradford Hill was well aware of the
asymmetrical nature of his criteria; however,
his followers have not always been so aware. 
The capacity of homo sapiens (who
should perhaps be called, with less hubris,
“homo stultus” because few, if any, other
species, consciously destroy their habitats) to
foresee and forestall disasters is limited.
Armed with greater humility, less hubris, and
a wider and wise application of the precau-
tionary principle, we could use the best of
more realistic systems and science to foresee
and forestall hazards. In doing so, it is hoped,
we will have more success than we have had
in the last 100 years, while stimulating inno-
vation through the encouragement of diverse
and robust technologies.
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Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic
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mination of best available technologies. The objec-
tive states: “Mindful of the Precautionary
Approach as set forth in Principle 15 of the Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development,
the objective of this Convention is to protect
human health and the environment from persis-
tent organic pollutants.” (Stockholm Convention
on Persistent Organic Pollutants 2001)
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